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Propositions accompanying the thesis
Reasoning with Defeasible Reasons
by Stipe Pandžić
1. Reasons are logical entities in themselves that cannot be reduced to propo-
sitions or inference rules. (Chapter 2, Chapter 3)
2. Default justification logic models defeasible arguments as object-level for-
mulas. (Chapter 2, Chapter 3)
3. The idea of rebutting reasons is well understood in the non-monotonic
reasoning community. Undercutting reasons, however, introduce an in-
tricate opposition among default reasons that cannot be adequately rep-
resented without reasons as terms of a logical language. (Chapter 2)
4. Default theories in justification logic are logical counterparts (“realiza-
tions”) of abstract argumentation frameworks that make structures of ar-
guments explicit in a logical language. (Chapter 3)
5. Undermining defeaters are intuitively understood as attacks on premises
of arguments. Their logical interpretation in justification logic requires
using belief revision operations that result in removing premises of a
default theory. (Chapter 4)
6. Classical logic is normative for human reasoning. Although rules of clas-
sical logic are non-defeasible, the norms they give rise to are defeasible.
(Chapter 5)
7. After you acquire a belief in the statement “At least one of my beliefs
is false”, this belief by itself does not cause joint inconsistency of your
beliefs. (Chapter 6)
8. Marcus Aurelius wisely claimed that “the opinion of 10,000 men is of
no value if none of them know anything about the subject”, but things
dramatically change when one of them is assigned as your reviewer.
9. Given the trends in academia, platitudes about “originality of research”
are best replaced with proverbs praising “like-mindedness”. The next
linguistic victim is the phrase “academic authorship”.
